

Operational Experience Feedback and reliability data

Eric Marsden


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
*Good judgment comes from experience.
Experience comes from bad judgment.*

– Nasrudin


Where does this fit into risk engineering?



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Use of reliability data

▷ **Managing maintenance:**

- forecasting cost of maintenance during system design
- preventive maintenance: stock management

▷ **Component design:**

- better knowledge of the reliability and the failure modes of your products



▷ **Risk analysis:**

- analyze and predict the occurrence of major accidents
- supply quantitative information used in safety cases & QRA



Use for safety cases

- ▷ Framework: use of **probabilistic methods** in **safety cases** or QRAs
- ▷ The top event whose probability we wish to estimate is rare
 - little statistical information on frequency is available
- ▷ One possible approach to quantifying probability:
 - decompose the rare event into a chain of events that have an observable frequency
 - determine, for each initiating event, the accident sequences that may lead to the top event
 - quantify the frequency of the initiating event
 - quantify the availability of the preventive and protective barriers

Fault tree




Fault tree




BOOLEAN EXPRESSION
 $F = A (B + C + D)$

Event tree



| IE | FE | FL1 | FL2 | FL3 | LS | Fatalties | OUTCOME | PROBABILITY | | NOTE | |
|----------------------------|---|---|--|-----|--------------|-----------|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| B/C suffers flooding event | Flooding event due failure of hull envelope | Primary flooding event Served space floods: 1 COMPARTMENT | Secondary event: slow progressive flooding Adjacent Hold, Ballast, store or void space floods: 2 OR Secondary event: RAPID Progressive flooding Adjacent Hold, Ballast/ Store or Void Space floods: MULTIPLE COMPARTMENTS | | Loss of ship | Fatalties | Consequence after flooding event | Frequency per ship year | Fatalties per ship year | Average ship age | Total number of fatalities |
| | | | | | | Yes | Side shell failure-holds + other space(s) flooded-total loss -Fatalities | 3.43E-05 | 1.10E-04 | 15 | 16 |
| | | | | | | No | space(s) flooded-total loss-No fatalities | 2.61E-04 | | 17 | |
| | | | | | | Yes | Side shell failure-hold(s) flood-survives -Fatalities | 1.37E-05 | 2.75E-05 | 18 | 4 |
| | | | | | | No | Side shell failure-hold(s) flood-ship survives-No fatalities | 7.97E-04 | | 17 | |
| | | | | | | Yes | Hold & other space(s) flooded-total loss-Fatalities | 9.62E-05 | 2.34E-03 | 20 | 341 |
| | | | | | | No | Hold & other space(s) flooded-total loss-No fatalities | 0.00E+00 | | | |
| | | | | | | Yes | Hold & other space(s) flooded-ship survives-Fatalities | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | | 0 |
| | | | | | | No | Hold & other space(s) flooded-ship survives-No fatalities | 0.00E+00 | | | |
| | | | | | | Yes | Served space alone flooded-total loss-Fatalities:** | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | | 0 |
| | | | | | | No | Served space alone flooded-total loss-No fatalities:** | 0.00E+00 | | | |
| | | | | | | Yes | Served space alone flooded-ship survives-Fatalities | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | | 0 |
| | | | | | | No | Served space alone flooded-ship survives-No fatalities | 0.00E+00 | | | |
| | | | | | | No | No flooding-Ship survives-No fatalities | 0.00E+00 | | | |
| | | | | | | | SUB-TOTALS> | 1.20E-03 | 2.48E-03 | | 361 |
| | Other Scenarios | | | | | 335 | Flooding scenarios other than side shell failure: Events separately assessed | 2.30E-03 | 9.60E-03 | | 1397 |
| | | | | | | | TOTALS> | 3.50E-03 | 1.21E-02 | 1,21E-02 | 1755 |

Bow tie diagram



Data sources

- ▷ Databases based on accidents on units identical to yours
 - good level of representativity
 - requires a large number of similar equipment observed over a long time period
- ▷ Tests of equipment in similar conditions to expected operation
 - very expensive; difficult to “accelerate time”
 - difficult to reproduce all details of operational conditions (temperature stress, vibration, corrosion, impact of maintenance...)
- ▷ Reliability data collected in the same industry
 - doesn't account for the specifics of your equipment, your maintenance policy
- ▷ “Generalist” data sources
 - don't account for the differences between industrial sectors
- ▷ Academic/technical literature
- ▷ Expert judgment
 - subjective, but allows the specificity of your plant/equipment to be taken into account

Reliability of reliability data

IEC 61511:2016, clause 11.9.3 states

“ *The reliability data used when quantifying the effect of random failures shall be credible, traceable, documented, justified and shall be based on field feedback from similar devices used in a similar operating environment.*

IEC 61511 standard *Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector* provides good engineering practices for the application of safety instrumented systems in the process sector. It's a sector-specific standard based on the generic framework proposed in the IEC 61508 *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems* standard.

Reliability databases


- ▷ **OREDA**: collection of reliability data on offshore equipment, managed by petroleum companies
 - detailed information on failure rates, repair times, failure modes
- ▷ NPRDS (Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System): data on reliability of equipment used in civil nuclear power plants in the USA
- ▷ *Base Process Equipment Reliability Database* (PERD) of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), AIChE
- ▷ Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCRD) compiled by UK HSE
- ▷ *ESReDA Handbook on Quality of Reliability Data* published by DNV
- ▷ *The Red Book* published by TNO, Dutch R&D organization

Reliability databases

Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems

Handbook with reliability data estimates for components of control and safety systems, based on the work of the PDS Forum.

Data dossiers for input devices (sensors, detectors, etc.), control logic (electronics) and final elements (valves, etc.) are presented, including data for subsea and drilling related equipment.



Example: applications of OREDA data

Main uses of OREDA reliability data are in the following areas:

| <i>Discipline</i> | <i>Typical Applications</i> |
|---|--|
| Design / Engineering | <p>Production availability and reliability management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production availability estimates (e.g. system performance simulation) • Design optimisation (e.g. evaluate justification for redundancy) • Reliability engineering (e.g. FMECA, equipment selection) <p>Safety and risk:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimate probabilities of critical events • Estimate survival time and system unavailability for safety-critical items • Analysis (SIL) of instrumented safety systems (ref.: IEC 61508/ 61511) |
| Operation/ Maintenance | <p>Asset management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking/ KPI parameters • Production assurance and decision-support <p>Reliability monitoring and maintenance optimisation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Optimise maintenance intervals and spare part storage • Integrated operations • Analyse reliability characteristics (e.g. lifetime distribution, failure mechanisms) • Reveal weak designs that need modification or redesign (feedback to manufacturer) |
| Typical analyses where data are used | Quantitative risk assessment, reliability centred maintenance, reliability based inspection, life cycle cost, production availability, safety integrity level (SIL), spare parts storage, manning resources, FMEA-analysis, benchmarking/ KPI assessment, root cause analysis, (ref.: ISO 20 815) |

Example: the OREDA taxonomy


The following types of equipment are covered in the OREDA database:

| Rotating machinery | Mechanical equipment | Control & Safety | Subsea equipment |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Combustion engines | Cranes | Control Logic Units | Control systems |
| Compressors | Heat exchangers | Fire & Gas detectors | Dry tree riser |
| Electric generators | Heaters and Boilers | HVAC | El. power distribution |
| Electric motors | Loading arms | Input devices | Flowlines |
| Gas turbines | Swivels | Nozzles | Manifolds |
| Pumps | Turrets | Power transformers | Pipelines |
| Steam turbines | Vessels | UPS | Production risers |
| Turboexpanders | Winches | Valves | Running tools |
| | | Frequency converters | Subsea pumps |
| | | Switchgear | Subsea vessels |
| | | | Templates |
| | | | Wellhead & X-mas trees |

Example: an OREDA datasheet

| Taxonomy no 2.2.2.13 | | Item Electric Equipment Electric motors Pump Only water treatment | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|---|---|--------|--------|--------|------|-------------------|-------------------|------|-----|
| Population 9 | Installations 1 | Aggregated time in service (10 ⁶ hours) | | | | | | No of demands | | | |
| | | Calendar time * 0.3039 | Operational time † 0.2406 | | | | | | | | |
| Failure mode | | No of failures | Failure rate (per 10 ⁶ hours). | | | | | Active rep.hrs | Repair (manhours) | | |
| | | | Lower | Mean | Upper | SD | n/τ | | Min | Mean | Max |
| Critical | 15* | 30.42 | 49.36 | 76.00 | 49.36 | 49.36 | 9.8 | 3.0 | 18.3 | 39.0 | |
| | 15* | 38.42 | 62.34 | 95.99 | 62.34 | 62.34 | | | | | |
| Breakdown | 3* | 2.70 | 9.87 | 25.52 | 9.87 | 9.87 | 11.2 | 8.0 | 19.7 | 27.0 | |
| | 3* | 3.41 | 12.47 | 32.23 | 12.47 | 12.47 | | | | | |
| Fail to start on demand | 3* | 2.70 | 9.87 | 25.52 | 9.87 | 9.87 | 8.2 | 3.0 | 14.3 | 37.0 | |
| | 3* | 3.41 | 12.47 | 32.23 | 12.47 | 12.47 | | | | | |
| Spurious stop | 2* | 1.17 | 6.58 | 20.72 | 6.58 | 6.58 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 6.0 | |
| | 2* | 1.48 | 8.31 | 26.16 | 8.31 | 8.31 | | | | | |
| Structural deficiency | 3* | 2.70 | 9.87 | 25.52 | 9.87 | 9.87 | 10.8 | 4.0 | 21.7 | 39.0 | |
| | 3* | 3.41 | 12.47 | 32.23 | 12.47 | 12.47 | | | | | |
| Vibration | 4* | 4.49 | 13.16 | 30.13 | 13.16 | 13.16 | 12.0 | 7.0 | 24.0 | 38.0 | |
| | 4* | 5.67 | 16.62 | 38.05 | 16.62 | 16.62 | | | | | |
| Degraded | 10* | 17.85 | 32.91 | 55.81 | 32.91 | 32.91 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 11.9 | 32.0 | |
| | 10* | 22.55 | 41.56 | 70.49 | 41.56 | 41.56 | | | | | |
| Overheating | 1* | 0.16 | 3.29 | 15.62 | 3.29 | 3.29 | 3.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | |
| | 1* | 0.21 | 4.16 | 19.72 | 4.16 | 4.16 | | | | | |
| Structural deficiency | 5* | 6.48 | 16.45 | 34.60 | 16.45 | 16.45 | 7.4 | 3.0 | 13.4 | 32.0 | |
| | 5* | 8.19 | 20.78 | 43.70 | 20.78 | 20.78 | | | | | |
| Vibration | 4* | 4.49 | 13.16 | 30.13 | 13.16 | 13.16 | 5.5 | 10.0 | 11.0 | 12.0 | |
| | 4* | 5.67 | 16.62 | 38.05 | 16.62 | 16.62 | | | | | |
| Incipient | 3* | 2.70 | 9.87 | 25.52 | 9.87 | 9.87 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | |
| | 3* | 3.41 | 12.47 | 32.23 | 12.47 | 12.47 | | | | | |
| Minor in-service problems | 3* | 2.70 | 9.87 | 25.52 | 9.87 | 9.87 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | |
| | 3* | 3.41 | 12.47 | 32.23 | 12.47 | 12.47 | | | | | |
| Unknown | 1* | 0.16 | 3.29 | 15.62 | 3.29 | 3.29 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | |
| | 1* | 0.21 | 4.16 | 19.72 | 4.16 | 4.16 | | | | | |
| Unknown | 1* | 0.16 | 3.29 | 15.62 | 3.29 | 3.29 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | |
| | 1* | 0.21 | 4.16 | 19.72 | 4.16 | 4.16 | | | | | |
| All modes | 29* | 68.27 | 95.44 | 130.12 | 95.44 | 95.44 | 7.9 | 2.0 | 14.5 | 39.0 | |
| | 29 | 86.22 | 120.53 | 164.34 | 120.53 | 120.53 | | | | | |
| Comments | | | | | | | | | | | |

Example: datasheet for flange, DNV guidance

|  Process Equipment Leak Frequencies | | Rev.: | 1 | |
|---|-------------|-----------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | Date: | 26/9/2012 | |
| Equipment Type: | | Source: | HCRD 10/92 - 03/10 | |
| Flange | | | | |
| Frequency Data: | | | | |
| Equipment Size | Category | Total | Full Pressure | Zero Pressure |
| 10 in | 1 - 3 mm | 8.880E-05 | 7.801E-05 | 1.884E-06 |
| | 3 - 10 mm | 3.252E-05 | 2.731E-05 | 1.430E-06 |
| | 10 - 50 mm | 1.176E-05 | 9.362E-06 | 1.225E-06 |
| | 50 - 150 mm | 2.077E-06 | 1.560E-06 | 5.388E-07 |
| | > 150 mm | 7.110E-06 | 5.780E-06 | 1.779E-06 |
| | Total | 1.423E-04 | 1.220E-04 | 6.856E-06 |
| 14 in | 1 - 3 mm | 1.088E-04 | 9.559E-05 | 4.148E-06 |
| | 3 - 10 mm | 3.984E-05 | 3.346E-05 | 3.148E-06 |
| | 10 - 50 mm | 1.440E-05 | 1.147E-05 | 2.696E-06 |
| | 50 - 150 mm | 2.544E-06 | 1.912E-06 | 1.186E-06 |
| | > 150 mm | 7.360E-06 | 5.956E-06 | 3.316E-06 |
| | Total | 1.729E-04 | 1.484E-04 | 1.449E-05 |
| 20 in | 1 - 3 mm | 1.379E-04 | 1.218E-04 | 1.454E-05 |
| | 3 - 10 mm | 5.051E-05 | 4.263E-05 | 1.103E-05 |
| | 10 - 50 mm | 1.826E-05 | 1.462E-05 | 9.450E-06 |
| | 50 - 150 mm | 3.226E-06 | 2.436E-06 | 4.158E-06 |
| | > 150 mm | 7.724E-06 | 6.218E-06 | 1.037E-05 |
| | Total | 2.176E-04 | 1.877E-04 | 4.955E-05 |



Source: issuu.com/dnv.com/docs/failure_frequency_guidance_process_


Example: complexity of data on “leak” event

| Release Type | | | Total | GAS LEAK | OIL LEAK | CONDEN-SATE LEAK | 2-PHASE LEAK | NON-PROCESS |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------|-------|----------|----------|------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Zero Pressure leak | | | 6% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 2% | 8% |
| Full pressure leak | Limited leak | | 48% | 33% | 75% | 64% | 67% | 53% |
| | Full leaks | ESD isolated | 43% | 57% | 16% | 27% | 30% | 36% |
| | | Late Isolated | 3% | 4% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 3% |
| Total | | | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Leaks may be of very different natures:

- ▷ full pressure or partial pressure
- ▷ frequency dependent on pipe diameter
- ▷ impact dependent on success of emergency shutdown (ESD) valves

Example: uncertainty on initiating event frequency



Comparison between DNV guidance and Belgium government data

Example: FIDES

- ▷ Reliability database for COTS electronic components
 - aeronautics and defence applications
 - detailed data on the impact of mechanical and thermal stress, on maintenance procedures; impact of design and quality assurance processes
 - data broken down by component supplier
 - also describes a reliability auditing method which allows the factors with most impact on reliability to be identified
- ▷ Aims to replace old standard MIL-HDBK-217F, which is overly pessimistic for COTS components
- ▷ Web: fides-reliability.org

COTS: Commercial Off-The Shelf

Difficulties

- ▷ Pulling together information from **heterogeneous sources**
- ▷ Integrating the influence of numerous factors on reliability
 - operating conditions: vibration, product characteristics, climate
 - inspection and maintenance policies
 - technological evolution
- ▷ Integrating **uncertainty** from different data sources
 - level of representivity increases with the number of observations
 - safety cases: the level of risk estimated generally comprises a factor of 10 of uncertainty

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Further reading

- ▷ IOGP report *Guide to finding and using reliability data for QRA*, available at www.iogp.org
- ▷ Booklet *Failure frequency guidance: process equipment leak frequency data for use in QRA* by DNV
- ▷ Risø technical report *Reliability Databases: State-of-the-Art and Perspectives*, available at orbit.dtu.dk

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